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DO JUDGES CHERRY PICK PRECEDENTS TO JUSTIFY EXTRA-
LEGAL DECISIONS?: A STATISTICAL EXAMINATION
ANTHONY NIBLETT*
I. INTRODUCTION
How important are legal precedents?  How much discretion do
judges have to apply or to ignore precedent?  Do judges cite prece-
dents merely to rationalize, post hoc, a decision that was driven by
extra-legal considerations?  Such questions have long been debated
theoretically.  Legal realists and legal skeptics have contended that ju-
dicial decisions may simply be made on a “hunch.”1  In their models
of judicial behavior, judges have biases and personal preferences that
influence the outcomes of cases.  Later, when writing opinions, judges
may selectively use precedent, possibly manipulating the existing case
law to provide precedential and often rhetorical authority for the deci-
sion.2  The legal realist and legal skeptic theories therefore suggest
* University of Chicago Law School, 1111 E. 60th Street, Chicago, IL 60611.  I thank
Adam Badawi, Douglas Baird, Thomas Baranga, Carlos Berdejo, Anthony Casey, Oleg
Itskhoki, Louis Kaplow, Ryan Lampe, Arden Rowell, and Andrei Shleifer for helpful discus-
sions and comments, and Alex D’Amour for assistance.  All errors are, of course, my own.
1. E.g., Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 287–88 (1929) (contending that judicial decisions
often rest on hunches and suggesting that “whether or not the judge is able in his opinion
to present reasons for his hunch which will pass jural muster, he does and should decide
difficult and complicated cases only when he has the feeling of the decision”).  Joseph
Chappell Hutcheson Jr. was a prominent federal judge at the time he wrote this piece. See
id. at 277–78 (explaining the author’s experiences “after eleven years on the Bench follow-
ing eighteen at the Bar”).  For a discussion that uses the “attitudinal theory” as a starting
place for explaining “what judges do when they are not just applying rules . . . to develop a
positive decision-theoretic account of judicial behavior” in “the open area . . . in which a
judge is a legislator,” see RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 1–15, 19–31 (2008); for a
discussion of the history and philosophy of the realism movement that concentrates on
adjudication as “a powerful and coherent theoretical view” and acknowledges the “largely
neglected, but substantial, contributions” made to the philosophy of law and legal realism,
see Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY
261, 261 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996); for a recent treatment on the economics of legal
realism that develops “a perspective on judging that can usefully be understood as the
modern manifestation of American Legal Realism” and maps out how “a more explicit
integration of the Realists’ conceptual insights about law and judicial behavior might en-
rich the rapidly expanding economic work in this field,” see generally Matthew C. Stephen-
son, Legal Realism for Economists, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 191 (2009).
2. See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 46 (1996) (dis-
cussing Justice Abe Fortas’s practice of writing draft opinions for the United States Su-
preme Court without citations and asking his law clerks to “decorate” them with the
necessary legal support).
234
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that judges simply cite those precedents that best suit their story.  This
hypothesis is tested in this Article.
I ask: Do judges simply cherry pick precedents to justify an extra-
legal decision?  In a sample of California appeals cases examining un-
conscionable contract provisions the answer appears to be no.  This
finding suggests that legal realists and legal skeptics have overstated
the degree to which precedent can be manipulated and have exagger-
ated the degree to which judges can misuse the discretion afforded
them.
The question posed in this Article is not a new one.  The ap-
proach taken to investigating this problem, however, is novel.  I empir-
ically examine the citation behavior of judges by looking at a pool of
legal opinions deciding one extremely narrow issue: the unconsciona-
bility of arbitration clauses in standard-form contracts.  Within this
pool, I compare cited precedents to precedents that are ignored in
the written opinion.
In the sphere of commercial law that I have chosen to investigate,
the outcomes of cases correlate with the perceived political prefer-
ences of the judge who wrote the opinion in the case at hand.3  This
finding suggests the possibility of extra-legal decision making.  The
data, however, uncover no evidence of judges cherry picking prece-
dents in those decisions where extra-legal behavior appears most
likely.  Put simply, for those cases that are at the margin—where the
outcome might be explained in terms of political preference—the
judges do not cite significantly more precedents with the same out-
come.4  The decisions of Republican judges in the sample tend to
favor defendants, but when Republican judges decide in favor of de-
fendants, they cite pro-defendant precedents just as frequently as
Democratic judges who decide for defendants.  Similarly, Democratic
judges tend to favor plaintiffs in the sample, but they cite pro-plaintiff
precedents with the same frequency as Republican judges when writ-
ing pro-plaintiff decisions.
Empirically analyzing citation behavior provides valuable insight
into judicial discretion.  Legal realists such as Jerome Frank,5 Oliver
3. See infra Part III.B.3.
4. See infra Part V.
5. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 138 (1930) [hereinafter FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND] (“For try as men will to avoid it, judging involves discretion
and individualization.”); Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?  Part One: The Effect on Legal
Thinking of the Assumption That Judges Behave Like Human Beings, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 29
(1931) (“One who patiently observes will learn the unguessability of even upper court deci-
sions and perceive that they are often functions of the chance composition of the bench.”);
Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human? Part Two: As Through a Class Darkly, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 233,
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Wendell Holmes,6 and Karl Llewellyn7 have contended that judges are
afforded a great deal of discretion that may generate imprecision or
indeterminancy of law.8  This indeterminacy, especially in commercial
law, generates transaction costs and imposes costs for the administra-
tion of the legal system.9  Judicial discretion can manifest itself in
many ways.  For example, a court may disagree with the outcome that
a bright-line rule generates in a particular case and use its discretion
to introduce exceptions,10 or a court may apply standards inconsis-
tently with precedent.11  Judges apply the relevant law to the facts of a
235 (1931) [hereinafter Frank, Are Judges Human?  Part Two] (“In sum, there is in actual
practice no possibility of delimiting the uncertainty of future decisions . . . .  All future
lawsuits are gambles.”).
6. See, e.g., O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457, 465–66
(1897) (suggesting that the object of the study of law is “prediction,” criticizing the “fal-
lacy” that legal decisions can be determined with mathematical precision and arguing that
“[b]ehind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of
competing legislative grounds,” which is “the very root and nerve of the whole
proceeding”).
7. See, e.g., K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 12–13 (4th prtg. 1973) (rejecting the
common notion that law is “a set of rules of conduct” and suggesting that law is actually
what officials “do about disputes” (emphasis omitted)). See generally Ugo Mattei, The Rise
and Fall of Law and Economics: An Essay for Judge Guido Calabresi, 64 MD. L. REV. 220, 230
(2005) (explaining that Llewellyn wanted to explore “‘legal life’” outside of libraries
(quoting LAURA NADER, THE LIFE OF THE LAW: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROJECTS 85–101
(2002))).
8. See FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 5, at 138–39 (suggesting that R
judges have a great amount of discretion “in determining what is the law of the case”).
9. Moreover, these inconsistencies and the idiosyncratic use of exceptions cast doubt
on the hypothesis that the common law converges to efficient rules. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 249–53 (7th ed. 2007) (explaining that “common law
doctrines create incentives for people to channel their transactions through the market”
and “to behave efficiently”); Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of the Com-
mon Law, 115 J. POL. ECON. 43, 46 (2007) (arguing that although judicial polarization “dis-
tort[s] the law away from efficiency,” it is nevertheless beneficial to the extent that it “may
lead to better law”); Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus
Statute Law: An Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 381–82 (2008) (stating that
“case law is a continuous, never-ending process of evolution of legal rules that is character-
ized by probabilistic convergence toward greater efficiency and predictability” and con-
cluding that convergence is “hindered, but never eliminated,” by judicial bias in decision
making that results in “extremism and uncertainty”).  Further, laws that are settled and
predictable will be litigated less often than laws that are unsettled or inconsistent.
10. See, e.g., Anthony Niblett, Richard A. Posner & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of a
Legal Rule, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2010) (on file with the Maryland Law Review)
(analyzing the evolution of the economic loss rule, concluding that “appellate courts exer-
cise a significant amount of discretion in deciding cases,” and rejecting “the hypothesis
that, in commercial fields, the common law is predictable and efficient, or at least is mov-
ing there”).
11. See Anthony Niblett, Tracking Inconsistent Judicial Behavior, 1, 2–5, 24–27 (July
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Maryland Law Review), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1434685 (using empirical analysis to
show that California appellate courts inconsistently enforce arbitration provisions and sug-
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case.  Judges not only have discretion over which facts to highlight,12
but they also have discretion over which aspects of the relevant law to
highlight.13  Commercial areas of law—such as contracts, torts, and
property—are largely governed by common law, and judges have dis-
cretion over the selection of precedents to be cited in the opinion.14
If judges can use their discretion to justify extra-legal decisions after
the fact, then the evolution of commercial law can be strongly influ-
enced to reflect these biases even though it appears that decisions are
consistent with precedent.
The existing empirical literature on citations of precedent has
not addressed the specific question posed in this Article.  The prior
literature that examines judicial citations divides somewhat cleanly
into two camps.15  Generally, these theories suggest that the prece-
dents cited are influential and inform the outcomes of cases.  The first
camp uses citations as a way to measure this influence, allowing re-
searchers to test which decisions, which judges, which circuits, and
which schools of thought have been most “influential.”16
gesting that “the primary source of this inconsistency is the political ideology of each of the
benches hearing cases”).
12. See Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, Judicial Fact Discretion, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
2–4 (2008) (identifying judicial bias and the reluctance of trial courts to be overruled on
appeal as two distinct motives for the exercise of judicial fact discretion).
13. See FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 5, at 138–39 (“The judge, in R
determining what is the law of the case, must choose and select, and it is virtually impossi-
ble to delimit the range of his choice and selection.”).
14. Frank, Are Judges Human?  Part Two, supra note 5, at 235 (“[T]here is in actual prac- R
tice no possibility of delimiting the uncertainty of future decisions, and of saying that in
property or commercial contract cases future decisions . . . are nicely predictable . . . .”).
15. I limit my discussion of the literature specifically to articles that examine judicial
citations.  But there is also literature on the economics of citation practices within
academia that is not examined here. See generally, e.g., David N. Laband, Article Popularity,
24 ECON. INQUIRY 173 (1986) (concluding that “a select few economists may exert a domi-
nant influence on advances in economic theory”); David N. Laband & Robert D. Tollison,
Intellectual Collaboration, 108 J. POL. ECON. 632 (2000) (comparing formal academic co-
authorship by economists with that of biologists and investigating the economic value of
informal colleague comments to authors); George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, The Cita-
tion Practices of Doctorates in Economics, 83 J. POL. ECON. 477 (1975) (applying an empirical
analysis of the use of precedents among economic doctoral students and leading econo-
mists to consider the influence of choice of school).
16. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 72–91 (1990) (sug-
gesting that citation studies may be used to measure judicial reputation and quantitatively
analyzing Justice Cardozo’s reputation through such a study); Mita Bhattacharya & Russell
Smyth, The Determinants of Judicial Prestige and Influence: Some Empirical Evidence from the High
Court of Australia, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 223 (2001) (expanding on the existing literature and
using judicial citation practice to investigate the determinants of judicial influence outside
of North America and on Australia’s highest court); Gregory A. Caldeira, On the Reputation
of State Supreme Courts, 5 POL. BEHAV. 83, 83–84, 104–05 (1983) (performing citation analy-
sis on a selection of state supreme court cases to develop a general measure of judicial
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The second camp assumes that citations reflect the biases of the
judge writing the opinion.17  These biases cast doubt on the influence
and quality of the cited precedent.18  Political bias, gender bias, and
school bias are just some of the various types of biases that have been
explored in the literature.19  A number of studies uncover political
bias, many of which examine citations in the aggregate instead of case-
by-case.20  A recent study by Professors Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati
uses opinion-level data to show that federal appellate judges are more
likely to cite outside-circuit decisions written by judges who were ap-
pointed by the same political party.21  This bias is stronger in “high
reputation and concluding that “social diversity, judicial professionalism, and political ide-
ology, in this order, constitute the most crucial determinants of [judicial] prestige”); Ste-
phen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking
of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004) (placing federal courts of appeals judges
from 1998 through 2000 in a judicial “tournament” to empirically and objectively measure
the merit of those judges and focusing on productivity, opinion quality, and judicial inde-
pendence as criteria for evaluating merit); Russell Smyth & Mita Bhattacharya, What Deter-
mines Judicial Prestige? An Empirical Analysis for Judges of the Federal Court of Australia, 5 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 233 (2003) (examining judicial citations to analyze the determinants of judi-
cial prestige in the Federal Court of Australia, an intermediate appellate court).  Further,
citations have been used to measure the influence of particular schools of thought. See
generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A Quan-
titative Study, 36 J.L. & ECON. 385 (1993) (using citation analysis to quantitatively investigate
the influence of economics on the law).
17. See generally, e.g., William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of
Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 319–25 (1998) (exploring, among
other factors, the racial, gender, and school biases of judges).
18. See generally Steven Goldberg, Federal Judges and the Heisman Trophy, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1237 (2005) (using “essentially anecdotal” evidence to argue against Choi and Gulati’s
suggestion that successful lower federal judges make the best Supreme Court Justices);
James D. Gordon III, Cardozo’s Baseball Card, 44 STAN. L. REV. 899, 903, 908 (1992) (review-
ing POSNER, supra note 16) (criticizing Judge Posner’s method of evaluating judicial reputa- R
tion in Cardozo: A Study in Reputation as “shallow empiricism” and suggesting that “[g]iven
the limitations of the scientific methodology, it will be both surprising and lamentable if
large numbers of judicial bibliometric studies begin to appear”).
19. See generally, e.g., David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individ-
ual Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 387–91 (1999) (suggesting
that judicial prestige can translate into judicial influence); Landes et al., supra note 17, at R
271–76, 318–25 (employing a “human capital approach” to measure the influence of indi-
vidual judges through empirical analysis of citations to published opinions and other iden-
tifying characteristics such as self-citations, law school quality, prior judicial experience,
ABA rankings, and political affiliation).
20. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window into the
Behavior of Judges?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 87, 89, 91 (2008) (finding that a judge’s political party
“is correlated with the willingness of a judge to make outside-circuit citations” and noting
that “[m]ost studies looking at citations focus on the aggregate numbers of citations a
judge receives and do not look on a case-by-case basis at how a judge decides when to cite
another opinion”).
21. Id. at 91, 118–21.
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stakes” subject matters that receive greater attention.22  While bias
may appear to diminish the proxy value of using citations as a measure
of objective influence, it is unclear whether this bias is different than
biases found in voting behavior.23
An assumption that underpins the existing literature in both
camps is that the precedent “informs” the legal decision and, by ex-
tension, the outcome.24  This Article explicitly tests the reverse causal
chain: Does the outcome of a case inform which precedents are cited?
I go a step further than simply asking whether judges are biased when
selecting precedents.  I ask whether citations data have any value or
any import in determining the direction of the law.
This unique testing of the causal chain is this Article’s main con-
tribution to the literature.  The test works in the following way.  I ex-
pect that pro-plaintiff decisions are more likely to cite pro-plaintiff
precedents and pro-defendant decisions are more likely to cite pro-
defendant precedents.  This is indeed what the data reveal.25  But pos-
itive correlation between the outcomes in cases and cited precedents
cannot alone address the question of causation because this positive
correlation is consistent with the legal realists’ story of ex post justifi-
cation and the standard story of influential precedents.26
How, then, can causation be parsed out from correlation?  The
methodology, detailed in Part V, exploits both that voting behavior in
22. See id. at 91, 95–96, 102–10, 119, 123. High stakes subject matter cases include
individual rights and campaign finance; lower stakes cases include bankruptcy or taxation.
Id.
23. Most of the empirical examinations of politics affecting judicial behavior focus on
voting behavior rather than citation practices. See generally, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R.
Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 836–41 (2008) (exploring past New
Legal Realism literature focused on judicial voting patterns). In addition, very little atten-
tion has been given to uncovering biases in so-called “mundane,” less putatively political
areas of law. See generally, e.g., Nancy Staudt et al., The Ideological Component of Judging in the
Taxation Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797, 1797–1800 (2006) (noting a lack of scholarship
on the reasoning underlying judicial decisions in the business and financial contexts, fill-
ing in the gap by conducting an empirical analysis of every United States Supreme Court
case from 1940 to 2005 decided under the Internal Revenue Code, and concluding that
liberal judges are more likely to vote with the government while conservative judges tend
to favor corporate taxpayers).
24. See, e.g., Landes et al., supra note 17, at 271 (“A citation to an opinion of Judge X R
reflects either the precedential value of that opinion or its ability to influence the decision
of another judge in a subsequent case.”).
25. See infra Parts IV.A–B, VI.C.
26. In the language of a statistician or econometrician, the outcome of a precedent is
an “endogenous regressor” in the explanation of whether a precedent is cited or not.  An
endogenous regressor simply means that changes in the left-hand side variable may cause
changes in the right-hand side variable.  For a more thorough explanation of endogenous
regressors, see JAMES H. STOCK & MARK W. WATSON, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS
343–44 (2003).
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the chosen sphere correlates with the politics of judges and that polit-
ics can be used as a predictor of the outcome of a case.  The following
two-part hypothesis will be tested: (1) The politics of the judge in-
forms the decision, and (2) the extra-legal component of the deci-
sion—that is, the element of the outcome predicted by politics—is
positively correlated with the citation of precedents with the same out-
come.  Ultimately, no evidence for this hypothesis is uncovered.27
The hypothesis rests on the presumption that if a judge wishes to
illustrate that the weight of authority agrees with her extra-legal deci-
sion, she will furnish her written opinion with precedents that support
her view.  Therefore, precedents are more likely to have the same out-
come as the case at hand.  I expect that a pro-plaintiff decision
reached on a hunch should be supported by more pro-plaintiff prece-
dents.  An alternative hypothesis suggests that a judge seeking to jus-
tify an extra-legal decision might distinguish precedents that stand in
opposition to her decision.28
The novelty of this approach extends beyond the explicit test of
causation.  The methodology employed also differs from previous
studies of citation behavior.  Previous literature largely fails to take
into account the pool of previous precedents available to a court at
the time of a decision.29  This study, instead, seeks to capture the pool
of all possible precedents30 by focusing on a single, narrow legal ques-
27. See infra Parts V, VI.C.
28. See Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of Their
Use and Significance, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 501 (discussing how judges can distinguish,
manipulate, and loosely follow precedents).  Alternatively, factors other than outcomes
may be a better indicator that judges are ex post rationalizing their decision.  Judges may,
for instance, cite precedents written by influential judges when rationalizing a decision. Cf.
Daniel A. Farber, Supreme Court Selection and Measures of Past Judicial Performance, 32 FLA. ST.
L. REV. 1175, 1183 n.29 (2005) (“[I]nfluential judges might sometimes be cited when they
merely follow existing circuit precedent, rather than making new law.”).  The data in this
study, however, do not address these claims specifically.
29. For an exemplary couple of articles that deal with citations within one issue by
analyzing the presence of citations to “outside” precedents and largely ignoring the pool of
precedent cases, see Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An
Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998), which specifically con-
siders federal decisions handed down in 1988 that consider the constitutionality of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the 1987 Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and David J.
Walsh, On the Meaning and Pattern of Legal Citations: Evidence from State Wrongful Discharge
Precedent Cases, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 337 (1997), which uses citations from a number of
cases—primarily state supreme court decisions but also lower state court decisions and
federal court decisions applying state law—that considered common law wrongful
discharge.
30. I use “precedent” here to simply mean any case on point that (a) has preceded the
case at hand and (b) was able to be cited.  In my analysis below, I distinguish between
binding precedents (supreme court decisions that bind the courts of appeal) and non-
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tion in one jurisdiction: Whether an arbitration provision in a stan-
dard-form contract is unconscionable.  I analyze not only when a
precedent from the pool is cited, but I also explicitly track when
precedents from the pool are not cited.  This allows me to provide an
answer to an important question: What is different about precedents
that are cited compared to those that are not?
Further, some of the previous literature uses univariate tests of
correlation or quantitative analyses that explore each variable in a
data set separately to measure the similarity of cases and cited prece-
dents.  Univariate tests, which only examine the overlap between two
variables, are not overly convincing since other factors such as time,
context, or publication status may be driving the results.31  My find-
ings make such controls explicit and yield further interesting insights
into judicial behavior.
Part II outlines the basic hypotheses to be tested.  Part III de-
scribes the data.  Part IV tests for positive correlation between out-
comes of the cases and outcomes of the cited precedents.  Part V tests
the causal relationship between outcomes and citations.  Part VI ex-
tends the investigation to shed more light on citation behavior by ex-
amining the quality of the citation and citation behavior in
unpublished opinions.  Part VII concludes.
II. HYPOTHESES
When writing a legal opinion, there is a history of precedents
from which a judge has discretion to draw in describing the common
law.32  What determines which precedents are cited?  This Part
presents two competing—and admittedly extreme—hypotheses.
Methods for testing these hypotheses are also introduced.
binding precedents (decisions from the same hierarchical level). See also infra note 54 and R
accompanying text.
31. For example, Professor David J. Walsh uses t-tests to analyze the similarity of out-
comes of cases and the precedents cited in the opinion, and he finds unconditional corre-
lation in certain subsets of the data only.  Walsh, supra note 29, at 343–50, 355–57. T-tests R
evaluate statistical significance. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ECONOMETRICS 16–17
(2005).  A similar methodology employed with my dataset (but not further discussed in this
Article) indicates that I yield significant differences in ideology between cited and non-
cited precedents with t-tests; that is, the average difference in ideology between judges is
greater in the precedents that are not cited than the average difference in ideology be-
tween judges when precedents are cited.  This is significant at the 1% level.  Taking a
multivariate approach, however, and controlling for factors such as time, context, hierar-
chy, and publication status indicates that the difference between cited cases and non-cited
cases is no longer significant.
32. See generally supra text accompanying notes 5–14. R
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A. Hypothesis 1: Citations Reflect the Entire Pool of All Precedents
on Point
Judges may cite precedents for a variety of reasons.33  Citations
may provide the reader with information about the legal back-
ground.34  If judges use pro forma citations that outline the history of
the law35 or are genuinely grappling with authority,36 then we may
assume that cited precedents accurately reflect the entire pool of
precedents.
This hypothesis can be tested using citation data by comparing
outcomes of cited precedents to outcomes of non-cited precedents.
Because there would be no significant difference between the out-
comes of precedents that are cited and those that are not cited if
judges discussed all cases on point—or a sample of cases that accu-
rately reflects the distribution—we would not expect to find a positive
correlation between outcomes of cases and outcomes of cited
precedents.
There are, however, many sensible reasons why outcomes of cited
precedents may not reflect the entire precedent pool.  If a large num-
ber of cases on point have been decided, it would be extremely labor
intensive and burdensome to cite all relevant precedents.37  Further,
simply showing a positive correlation between the outcomes of cited
precedents and the outcome of the case at hand may reflect omitted
variables.  For example, courts may be less likely to cite precedents as
time elapses, a phenomenon that Professor William Landes and Judge
33. I do not provide an exhaustive list of reasons.  See Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of the Use of Citations in the Law, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 381, 383–87 (2000) for a
more complete discussion of reasons and hypotheses.
34. See generally Choi & Gulati, supra note 20, at 99 (explaining that “routine” or “pro R
forma citations” include “boilerplate string cites that some judges may cut and paste for
matters such as the standard of review”); Posner, supra note 33, at 384 (suggesting that R
citations can “incorporate a body of information by reference,” so the reader knows where
to find the rest of the relevant background).
35. See generally Posner, supra note 33, at 384 (explaining that citations “identify a R
source of information, so that the reader of the citing work can verify the accuracy of
statements of fact made in it”).
36. See generally id. at 385 (noting that citations can “identify works or persons with
which or with whom the author of the citing work disagrees” and “provide an authoritative
basis for a statement in the citing work”).
37. Cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empiri-
cal Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 259 (1976) (“Arguably, whether a judge cites many or few
cases is largely a matter of personal preference or taste for citing cases.  One possibility is
that the judge with little taste for citing cases will tend to cite only the most recent cases,
either because he lacks information on the relevance of earlier decisions, wants to econo-
mize his time, or believes that more recent ones tend to have greater precedential
significance.”).
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Richard Posner describe as “depreciation of legal capital.”38  Positive
correlation in outcomes may reflect the existence of subsets of “like”
cases within a precedent pool.  Courts are more likely to cite prece-
dents of similar background than those of different legal and factual
contexts.39  These factors can be controlled for using multivariate re-
gression analysis.40  If the positive correlation survives such controls
and the outcomes of cited precedents align closely with the outcome
in the case at hand, the hypothesis that cited precedents reflect all
precedents from the pool can be rejected.
If outcomes of cited precedents and cases at hand are positively
correlated, it may be for one of two reasons: Judges may be biased in
their description of the law, selectively providing authority to justify
decisions made extra-legally, or judges may simply cite those prece-
dents that were influential in reaching the decision.  The second hy-
pothesis postulates a causal chain.
B. Hypothesis 2: Citations Reflect Ex Post Justification of Decisions
Reached Extra-Legally
Judges may decide cases for extra-legal reasons and then select
precedents to support their decisions.  Under this hypothesis, written
opinions present a biased description of the law that coerce the
reader into believing that cited precedents that have the same out-
come as the case at hand reflect the law, and thus justify a decision
actually reached through extra-legal means.  Judges may choose not to
cite precedents that contradict their desired outcome in an opinion.41
Therefore, outcomes of cases will reflect outcomes of cited prece-
dents.  A causal relationship cannot simply be inferred, however, from
such positive correlation.  The positive correlation could instead re-
38. Id. at 262–70.  For a more extensive discussion of the phenomenon that cites age as
one factor that contributes to “precedent vitality” and undertakes “a systemic empirical
examination of how Supreme Court precedents evolve over the years, as the Court treats
them positively or negatively,” see THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLIT-
ICS OF PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 23, 55–77 (2006).
39. Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 37, at 259 (explaining that economists “expect[ ] R
citation practices to be basically uniform across judges” and believe that “[i]f a judge cites
more cases, it is not because his taste for citations is different but because the case before
him is different—perhaps it has more issues, or its issues are less clearly controlled by some
precedent”).
40. Multivariate regression analysis uses two or more right-hand side variables to ex-
plain the left-hand side variable. That is, the explanatory equation has at least two regres-
sors.  For more on multivariate analysis, see STOCK & WATSON, supra note 26, at 142–84, R
241–65.  Multivariate tests can be contrasted to univariate tests that have only one regres-
sor. See generally id. at 91–130.
41. The causal chain under this hypothesis is as follows:
preferences → outcomes → citations
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flect the more traditional view of precedent and citations—that is,
that judges use precedent as legal authority and “render the decision
that is dictated by those authorities.”42
Using an instrumental variable approach, I provide a test of Hy-
pothesis 2.  Do outcomes “cause” citations?  Instrumental variables are
used in statistics and econometrics to determine the direction of cau-
sation when natural experiments are not available.  If, for example,
one suspects that a change in the left-hand side variable causes a
change in the suspect explanatory, right-hand side variable, an “instru-
ment” may be used for the suspect explanatory variable.  An instru-
ment is simply a variable that does not necessarily belong in the
explanatory equation; the instrument is correlated with the suspect
explanatory variable, conditional on the other right-hand side
variables.43
Here, my instrument for the suspect variable (outcomes) is judicial
preference.  My measure of judicial preference is simple—perhaps
even crude—but effective for this study: the political party of the gov-
ernor who appointed the judge writing the opinion.  Essentially, the
argument is that the party of the appointing governor reflects judicial
preferences.44
This instrumental variable approach may also help overcome bias
from omitted factors that affect the outcome and the types of cases
that are cited, because other factors may affect the outcome of the
case and the tendency of a judge to cite a precedent but will not affect
who appointed the judge.45  One example of omitted variable bias is
the inability to control for the relative quality of legal representation.
In a given case, lawyers from one side may present a more cogent case,
generating positive correlation between the outcomes of cited prece-
dents and the outcome of the cases at hand.46  The political appointer
of the writing judge is unlikely to be correlated with such factors.
42. See Cross et al., supra note 28, at 494–95 (“Justices examine the legal authorities R
cited by the parties, which substantially include precedents, and render the decision that is
dictated by those authorities.”).  This is visually represented in the following model:
influential precedents → outcomes
influential precedents → citations
43. For a more detailed treatment of instrumental variables regression, see STOCK &
WATSON, supra note 26, at 331–65. R
44. See infra note 57.  This is visually represented in the following model: R
politics (preferences) → outcomes → citations
45. See supra note 43. R
46. Cf. Stephen Bright, Gideon—A Generation Later, Introduction & Keynote Speakers, 58
MD. L. REV. 1333, 1377 (1999) (explaining that a plaintiff must prove that “the lawyer’s
performance was so deficient that it affected the outcome of the trial”); Stephen B. Bright,
Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\70-1\MLR107.txt unknown Seq: 12  3-DEC-10 11:26
2010] A STATISTICAL EXAMINATION 245
There may be other extra-legal dimensions of judicial preference
that affect outcomes and require ex post legal justification in the writ-
ten opinion.  If judicial outcomes are driven by other extra-legal fac-
tors, such as sympathy for a particular party, and if such factors are not
correlated with politics, the instrument will not pick them up.47
The validity of the instrument is discussed in greater detail in
Parts V and VI.
III. DATA
A. Source of Data
The dataset contains observations of 72 reported California
Courts of Appeal cases and 7 California Supreme Court cases.48  The
cases answer a very narrow question: Is the arbitration clause in a stan-
dard-form contract unconscionable?  The dataset contains—to the
best of my knowledge—all reported appeals cases in this jurisdiction
answering this narrow question as of February 2008.49
Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 791 (“Competent legal representation is essential
to ensure that such decisions [on punishment] are as well informed as humanly
possible.”).
47. See generally Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV.
1011, 1071 & n.233 (2003) (noting that identical parties should get equal treatment but
acknowledging that factors like sympathy or prejudice may influence the outcome of a
case).  This is visually represented in the following model:
political component of preferences → outcomes → citations
other components of preferences → outcomes → citations
48. The set also contains data from 102 unreported California Courts of Appeal cases.
The citation behavior in these cases will be discussed in Part VI.B.
49. All data are obtained from LexisNexis.  To obtain the set of cases, a search for
“state court cases, combined” decided prior to February 18, 2008 that satisfied all of the
following criteria was conducted: (1) either of the terms “contract!” or “agree!”; (2) the
wild-card “unconscionab!”; (3) the wild-card “arbitrat!”; and (4) any of the following terms
in either “Overview” or “Core Terms”—“standard-form,” “standard form,” “boiler-plate,”
“boiler plate,” or “adhesi!”.  The exact search string was: (CORE-TERMS(contract! OR
agree!) OR OVERVIEW(contract! OR agree!)) AND (CORE-TERMS(unconscionab!) OR
OVERVIEW(unconscionab!)) AND (CORE-TERMS(arbitrat!) OR OVERVIEW(arbitrat!))
AND (“standard-form” OR “standard form” OR “boiler-plate” OR “boiler plate” OR
“adhesi!”).
The first criterion restricts the analysis to contract law cases.  The second criterion
attempts to limit the search to those cases where unconscionability was the primary doc-
trine under consideration.  The third criterion limits the type of clause, so that unconscio-
nability cases that involve illegal disclaimers or excessive pricing are not included.  The
fourth criterion restricts the search to cases where the contract is a standard-form contract.
(The use of the wild-card “adhesi!” captures the use of the label “contracts of adhesion”
and “adhesive contract”—labels commonly used by judges to describe standard-form con-
tracts.)  This search strategy captures all state appeals cases from all fifty states.
This search yields exactly 499 cases.  The results were then restricted to California,
yielding 199 cases.  Of these, 18 cases did not make any findings on the unconscionability
of an arbitration provision under California law and therefore could not be included in the
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Variables of interest were coded including whether the contract
was deemed unconscionable, the date the judgment was delivered, the
district where the case was heard, the characteristics of the presiding
judges, and the environment in which the contract was formed.  Text
parsing software was used to count the frequency of particular words
and phrases that were used by the judge writing the opinion.50  Thus,
I was able to track the facts that the judge found important and com-
pare similarities in the language used in the case and in the
precedent.
A dataset of pairwise observations was generated.  Each observa-
tion compares variables of interest in the case at hand to variables of
interest in the precedent.  I compared only those pairs where the deci-
sion in the case at hand was delivered after the reported precedent.
For simplicity, this pairwise dataset was broken into two.  The first
dataset compares all reported courts of appeal cases to all reported
courts of appeal precedents.  This dataset contains 2,556 observations.
The second dataset compares all reported courts of appeal cases to
supreme court precedents.51  This dataset contains 273 observations.
Each observation is a “potential citation.”  The precedents cited by the
courts of appeal in each case were tracked, as were those precedents
that are applicable but not cited.  All citations considered in this Arti-
cle come from the majority opinion in each case.52
Taking “potential citations” as the universe for study generates
explanatory value that, to my knowledge, has not previously been ex-
plored.  Take the following example.  Suppose that we are interested
in whether the cited precedents share a particular trait that is present
in the case at hand.  The study focuses on the outcome of the cases—
that is, liable (L) or not liable (NL).53  The left panel in Figure 1 repre-
sents information commonly found in the empirical citation litera-
dataset.  Unconscionability in these particular cases was merely discussed by the court in
the context of another claim, or perhaps the court decided not to issue a finding on un-
conscionability.  Cases decided in California that did not use California law were also re-
moved.  Of the remaining 181 cases, 7 were decided by the California Supreme Court and
174 were decided by the California Courts of Appeal.  Seventy-two of the 174 cases were
reported—these cases formed the basis of the first dataset in this Article.  The second
dataset included the 7 California Supreme Court cases.  The extension in Part VI.B uses
the data from the 102 unpublished cases.
50. A list of the words and phrases that were analyzed can be found in the Appendix.
51. All cases from the California Supreme Court are reported cases.
52. Dissents are rare in the dataset.  Only 5 of the 72 reported courts of appeal deci-
sions contain a dissenting opinion (usually dissenting as to one small part of the majority
decision).  I do not report the properties of citations contained in dissents since the 5
dissenting judgments cite a total of only 6 courts of appeal cases—a number too small to
generate results of any significance.
53. I use this particular trait throughout the example.
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ture.  The judge in the example cites two precedents that share the
same trait of interest as the case at hand.  The case at hand finds the
defendant liable, as do the two precedents.  But what inferences can be
drawn from this observation?  To establish that the judge over-
represented precedents that held the defendant liable, it must be es-
tablished that the precedents that were not cited in the case at hand
disproportionately held the defendant not liable. If the potential cita-
tions that are not cited are an accurate reflection of the entire pool of
potential citations, then the judge writing the opinion will be citing a
sample of precedents that are representative of the entire pool.
The panels on the right of Figure 1 represent different precedent
pools.  Different conclusions would be reached after examining these
two precedent pools.  The top panel illustrates a situation in which the
two cited precedents were the only relevant precedents on point.  It
would be difficult to argue that the judge overrepresented liable prece-
dents in this example.  The bottom panel illustrates a situation in
which the judge has nine potential precedents from which to choose.
The judge only cites the two liable precedents and fails to cite the
seven precedents that held the defendant not liable.  Here, an infer-
ence that liable cases are overrepresented relative to the entire prece-
dent pool is plausible.
Outcome in case
at hand
Outcome in cited
precedents
L
L
L
Outcome in case
at hand
Outcome in cited
precedents
L
L
L
Outcome of cases
in precedent pool
L
L
Outcome in case
at hand
Outcome in cited
precedents
L
L
L
Outcome of cases
in precedent pool
L L NL
NLNLNL
NLNLNL
FIGURE 1: The panel on the left illustrates the information commonly found in the citation
literature; the characteristics of a case are compared to the characteristics of cited prece-
dents only.  The panels on the right illustrate two potential scenarios consistent with this
information.  The top right panel shows that the two cited precedents are the only two
precedents on point.  The bottom right panel shows that the two cited precedents are two
of nine precedents on point (potential citations) and the seven precedents not cited did
not share the same characteristic as the cited precedents.
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B. Summary of Data
1. Citations
Of the 2,556 potential citations of courts of appeal precedents,
there are only 239 actual citations of precedent.  That is, on average,
in a given opinion, a court of appeal cites less than 1 in 10 of its previ-
ous opinions.  Citations of supreme court decisions are, not surpris-
ingly, far more frequent.  The courts of appeal have less discretion to
cite supreme court precedents than courts of appeal precedents.54  Of
the 273 potential citations of supreme court precedents, there are 129
actual citations (or just under half).
2. Outcomes of Cases
The measurement of “outcome” is confined to the narrow deter-
mination of unconscionability: Does the court refuse to enforce the
arbitration clause as written on the basis that it is unconscionable?  The
decisions are split fairly evenly throughout the dataset with 39 of the
72 courts of appeal cases finding that the provision was unconsciona-
ble (54.17%) and 5 of the 7 supreme court cases finding that the pro-
vision was unconscionable (71.43%).  Turning to the pairwise
datasets, the same outcome is found in the case at hand and in the
precedent case in about half of the observations.55
3. Politics and Judicial Preferences
The enforcement of arbitration provisions in standard-form con-
tracts appears to be an area of commercial law, like contract enforce-
ment, where politics plays a significant role in determining the
outcome.56  I track the political party of the governors who appointed
54. See generally JEFFERY A. HOGGE ET AL., 5-41 CALIFORNIA APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 41.31[1] (2010) (explaining that “court[s] of inferior jurisdiction” are required
“to follow the decisions of a court exercising superior jurisdiction,” such that “decisions by
the California Supreme Court are binding on all of the courts of California”); Keenan D.
Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism,” 92 CAL. L. REV.
1441, 1466–67 (2004) (explaining that the rule of “vertical precedent” requires lower
courts to “abide by controlling precedent” and commenting “that the act of disregarding
vertical precedent qualifies as one kind of judicial activism”).
55. The case and the courts of appeal precedent have the “same outcome” in 1,269 of
the 2,556 potential citations (49.65%).  The case and the supreme court precedent have
the “same outcome” in 139 of the 273 potential citations (50.92%).
56. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitra-
tion Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 667–86 (1999) (finding that the outcomes of
similar cases involving contracts with arbitration clauses in Alabama are correlated with the
politics of presiding judges, particularly with the source of campaign funds); Niblett, supra
note 11, at 2, 24–25 (showing that the conflicting ideologies of the panels in different R
contract cases is highly correlated with inconsistent decisions).  The correlation that I am
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each presiding judge to a court of appeal.  This measure is used as a
proxy for the ideology of the judge.  While this method of measuring
ideology is crude and imperfect, it provides insight into judicial pref-
erences.57  It is assumed that (1) Republican judges are more inclined
to enforce arbitration provisions and decide in favor of the drafting
party, the defendant, and (2) Democratic judges are more inclined to
take into account equity issues and assist the weaker, nondrafting
party, the plaintiff.  In each case, the defendant is a corporation, and
the plaintiff is an employee or a consumer.
In the pairwise dataset, a variable is generated that measures po-
tential conflict between the ideology of the judge who writes the opin-
ion and the outcome of the precedent.  This variable, simply referred
to as conflicting politics, is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the
authoring judge was appointed by a Democratic governor and the pre-
interested in—between the politics of the writing judge and the outcome of the case—is
discussed in greater detail in Part V.
57. For more on the issue of using political appointment as a measure of ideology and
judicial preference, see generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 430–35 (2002) (“If the Supreme Court’s
decision that handed George W. Bush the election tells us anything, it’s that the Supreme
Court is more secure and more comfortable than it has ever been in pushing an agenda
that is not only activist and conservative, but also blatantly partisan.”); Archibald Cox, The
Role of the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism or Self-Restraint?, 47 MD. L. REV. 118, 135 (1987)
(“Making or appearing to make appointments simply with an eye to obtaining a predict-
able vote on policy grounds tends to weaken public belief in ‘law,’ and also to make the
actual style of decisionmaking still more political.”); Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Deci-
sion Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1347–50 (1998) (criticizing a past study
that uses appointing President as a proxy for ideology because, in particular, “the catego-
ries ‘Democrat’ and ‘Republican’ do not necessarily match sympathy towards greater or
lesser degrees of environmental protection”); Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Infer-
ence, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 87–97 (2002) (examining the concept of validity by critiquing
various empirical studies by scholars in the legal academy that have considered the impact
of ideology on judicial preference); Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What is Judicial
Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 167–72 (2009) (ex-
amining the appointee’s party as a proxy for a judge’s ideology and stating, with caveats,
that such a consideration “can be useful and significant predictors of judicial voting”);
Michael J. Pitts, What Will the Life of Riley v. Kennedy Mean for Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act?, 68 MD. L. REV. 481, 527 (2009) (exploring further the “attitudinal model,” which
suggests that Justices have ideological preferences that “creep into Court decision-making
because traditional legal arguments, such as precedent, statutes, and legislative history are
often indeterminate and leave judges with discretion to render policy judgments”); Greg-
ory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates about Statistical
Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743 (2005) (performing an empirical study of religious free-
dom decisions by the federal district and circuit courts with a particular focus on “variables
that attempt to quantify the anticipated ideological leanings of judges” and concluding
that although “ideology emerged as significant in certain aspects of [the] study,” it was not
“ubiquitous or dominating”); Niblett, supra note 11, at 24 n.40 (recognizing that measur- R
ing political affiliation by the governor’s political party “is not a perfect measure of political
ideology”).
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cedent case favored the defendant or if the authoring judge was ap-
pointed by a Republican governor and the precedent was decided in
favor of the plaintiff.  The variable otherwise takes the value 0.58
4. Controls
I also controlled for a variety of factors that are likely to affect
citations.  Two controls, in particular, are discussed in detail below.
a. Time Between Decisions
The earliest case in the dataset is from 1980.59  The most recent
case is from October 2007.60  Cases are not distributed evenly over this
twenty-seven year period.  Over 70% of cases were decided in the last
ten years of the dataset.  For each observation in the pairwise datasets,
I measure the length of time between the case at hand and the prece-
dent cited.  I find evidence to support Landes and Posner’s deprecia-
tion of legal capital theory: Precedents are cited with less frequency as
time elapses.61  This is true of both courts of appeal precedents and
supreme court precedents.  Figure 2 tracks the trend of the incidence
of citation between the case at hand and the precedent as time
elapses.  A clear downward trend is shown with both courts of appeal
precedents (solid line) and supreme court precedents (dashed line).
58. Although I examined other measures of politics and preferences, their validity as
an instrument was questionable.  For example, I tracked the differences in ideology of the
judges who wrote the opinions, as well as the difference in ideology of the benches.  Unlike
the conflicting politics variable, and as explained in Part V, neither of these differences was
significantly correlated with the similarity of the results between cases and precedents.
59. Ramirez v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. Rptr. 223 (Ct. App. 1980).  The first unpub-
lished decision is from 1977.  N.V. Heathorn, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 138 Cal. Rptr.
357 (Ct. App. May 13, 1977) (depublished).  The first supreme court case in the sample,
Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981), was decided in 1981.
60. Murphy v. Check ‘N Go of Cal., Inc., 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 120 (Ct. App.), modified, No.
A114442, 2007 Cal. App. LEXIS 2181 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2007).  The most recent un-
published decision is from February 2008.  Price v. Plant Stand, No. G038361, 2008 Cal.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 1145 (Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2008).  The most recent supreme court case in
the sample, Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556 (Cal. 2007), was decided in August 2007.
61. See Landes & Posner, supra note 37, at 262–63 (“Although a precedent does not R
‘wear out’ in a physical sense, it depreciates in an economic sense because the value of its
information content declines over time with changing circumstances.”).
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FIGURE 2: The frequency of a precedent’s citations declines as time elapses.
Figure 2 also shows that citations of courts of appeal precedents
trend uniformly downward as time elapses.  Citations of supreme
court precedents yield a more intriguing shape with an up-tick in cita-
tions after twenty years have passed.  My anecdotal explanation for
this (which suggests that this is not a general result) relies on the fact
that (as noted above) the vast majority of the courts of appeal cases
come from the last decade.  There were two supreme court decisions
on point in the early to mid-1980s: Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.62 and
Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams.63 Graham is an on point decision that lays
out the common law framework for determining the unconscionabil-
ity of arbitration clauses.64 Dryer is a much shorter decision that offers
only minor clarifications in the law.65  This difference in the impor-
tance of Graham and Dryer may suggest that the “trough” in citations is
likely to persist in the future. That is, even though it is older, Graham
62. 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981).
63. 709 P.2d 826 (Cal. 1985).
64. Graham, 623 P.2d at 172–78 (outlining the requirement that arbitration clauses
have “‘minimum levels of integrity’”).
65. Dryer, 709 P.2d at 831–33 (explaining that “[t]he trial court concluded that the
arbitration provisions failed to meet [the] ‘minimum levels of integrity’ required by Gra-
ham solely because of the remote—indeed, speculative—possibility of commissioner inter-
vention,” but noting that neither Graham’s holding nor its reasoning “dictate[d] this
result”).
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will continue to gather more citations than Dryer because it is on point
and lays out the applicable legal framework.
b. Measuring Similarities in Context Between Cases
Cases within the narrowly defined universe of the dataset used for
analysis are not uniform.  The contexts in which the cases arise differ.
This will affect whether a case is cited or not.66  “Context” is measured
in two ways.  The first way is very simple: I look at the contracting
environment, that is, the type of contract involved.  The cases are di-
vided in two: employment contracts (37 of the 72 cases, or 51.39%)
and sales contracts (35 of the 72 cases, or 48.61%).  I am interested in
uncovering whether courts are more likely to cite a precedent if it
involves the same contracting environment.
The second measure of context is a little more complex.  Courts
may focus on different aspects of the facts in different cases.67  This is
controlled because a case that heavily discusses the complexity of the
standard-form contract would be more likely to cite a precedent that
also focuses heavily on contractual complexity compared to a prece-
dent that focuses on other factors such as whether the arbitration pro-
cess was biased.  A measure of the similarity between the two types of
written opinions is provided.
I generate a count of 312 key terms to capture the factors that the
court emphasizes.68  The key terms are divided into four themes: (1)
complexity of the contract in question; (2) the weakness of the plain-
tiff; (3) factors negating plaintiff consent; and (4) the neutrality of the
arbitration provision.  I count the number of times each opinion men-
tions a key term when discussing the facts of each case,69 relating to
66. On the question of context and for the specific argument that rules of relevance of
factors in a particular context guide whether a precedent applies in a given situation, see
Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 576–79 (1987).
67. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. R
68. The list of these 312 key terms is provided in the Appendix.
69. I do not use the entire written opinion when calculating the scores to measure
context.  Rather, I focus attention on the facts of the case at hand.  Specifically, I isolate the
facts of the case that are relevant to the claimed unconscionability of the arbitration clause.
Using the entire opinion would bias the results.  When judges write decisions, they tend to
make a number of references to the facts of other cases, either to show that this case is
similar to or can be distinguished from the previous case. Cf. Cross et al., supra note 28, at R
510 (examining how other commentators discuss the judicial ability to flexibly distinguish
cases).  Using the entire opinion would capture factual elements of other cases and would
not accurately map the court’s portrayal of procedural and substantive concerns in these
specific cases.  At the other extreme, simply using the “facts” section of each case would not
provide enough information; judges often lay out only the bare facts in these sections such
as who is suing whom, what claims are being made, and what findings the trial court made.
Many of the salient facts in the cases under study such as those related to contractual
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each of the four factors to generate a total for each category.  I label
that total cf.  I then create a measure of the relative emphasis placed on
each factor in a particular written opinion.70  Next, I compare the rel-
ative emphasis placed on each factor in a case and a given precedent
by summing the difference in relative emphasis among each of the
four factors to create a new measure.71
Intuitively, the resulting measure provides a quantitative evalua-
tion of the “difference” between what courts emphasize in given opin-
ions and precedents.  For each case-precedent pair there is now a
score.72  A low score indicates that the relative emphasis placed on
each of the four categories measured in the two respective cases is very
similar.  This means that each focused its attention on similar aspects
of the facts.  A high score suggests that the two decisions place relative
emphasis on different factors.  It is expected that when this “differ-
ence” is greater, the court is less likely to cite a precedent.73
complexity or how weak the plaintiff is perceived to be, are often discussed only in the
“analysis” or “discussion” sections of the written opinions.
It is therefore necessary to strip down the written opinions so that only the informa-
tion relevant to the mapping is retained.  This is done by removing references to judicial
and legislative history and any factual descriptions of previous cases that may appear.  Fur-
ther, only majority opinions are utilized in this analysis; dissenting and concurring opin-
ions are not analyzed.  In addition, quotations from other cases are largely eliminated
unless the quotation is followed by a statement indicating similarity with the case at hand.
Moreover, the litigants’ contentions that the court expressly disagrees with are re-
moved.  For example, the opinion may cite a series of arguments by the defendant that the
contract is not a contract of adhesion, but then conclude with “we disagree” or “we find
these contentions unpersuasive.”  Leaving these arguments in would not provide an accu-
rate description of the court’s view of the procedural and substantive concerns of the
provision.
Irrelevant information that may arise in the course of a written opinion is also re-
moved.  Courts, for instance, may discuss elements of a case that in no way relate to the
unconscionability of the arbitration provision.  For example, in Camilo Lopez, Inc. v. Sialic
Contractors Corp., No. B170164, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 377 (Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2005),
the court wrote: “We take this opportunity to indicate our displeasure at the language,
tone and presentation of Lopez’s briefs.  The sarcastic and caustic comments which perme-
ate its briefs are indecorous and unprofessional.  The repeated use of bolding, italicizing,
underlining and parenthetical commentary rendered the briefs virtually unreadable.”  Id.
at *9–10.  If this quotation were left in the study, the measure of the complexity of the
contract would be biased, as many of the words included in this paragraph are key words
used to determine the complexity of the contract.
70. This measure, mfi, is created thus:
mfi = cfi / S cfi
71. This measure is created using the equation:
Dik = 0.25 * S  mfi – mfk 
72. As illustrated:
0 = Dik = 1
73. By way of illustration, across all the pairwise observations with published opinions,
the highest score was 0.38.  The two cases here were Balandran v. Labor Ready, Inc., 22 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 441, 445–47 (Ct. App. 2004), in which the court focused on whether an arbitra-
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IV. CORRELATION: HYPOTHESIS 1 IS REJECTED: THE OUTCOMES OF
CITED PRECEDENTS DO NOT REFLECT THE ENTIRE POOL OF
PRECEDENTS
A. Univariate Analysis
What is different about those pairs where a precedent is cited and
those pairs where a precedent is not cited?  To answer this question,
the statistical breakdown in Table 1 illustrates the difference between
pairs where the case at hand cites the precedent case (cited) and pairs
where the case at hand does not cite the precedent case (not cited).  A
statistical comparison of the two groups indicating whether selected
differences between them are statistically significant—that is, whether
the difference between the two factors is unlikely to have occurred by
chance—is also presented.  The data is broken down by court level to
illustrate differences in the citation practices of supreme court prece-
dents and courts of appeal precedents.
DATASET 1: DATASET 2:
COURTS OF APPEAL PRECEDENTS SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS
Not
Cited Not cited Difference Cited Cited Difference
(n=239) (n=2,317) (t-stat) (n=129) (n=144) (t-stat)
Same outcome 62.34% 48.33% 4.13*** 58.14% 44.44% 2.27**(% of cases)
Difference in 4.03 9.11 -10.29*** 7.40 12.41 -5.40***time (years)
Same
contractual type 69.04% 47.30% 6.45*** 54.26% 47.92% 1.04
(% of cases)
Difference in 0.532 0.589 -3.00*** 0.494 0.672 -4.76***factors (score)
Same judge on
both panels (% 7.11% 3.19% 3.11*** - - -
of cases)
Same district 29.29% 24.17% 1.74* - - -(% of cases)
TABLE 1: Differences between precedents that are cited and precedents that are not cited.
tion clause within an employment contract applied to pre-employment negotiations, and
Fittante v. Palm Spring Motors, Inc., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 659, 669–74 (Ct. App. 2003), in which
the court placed emphasis on whether the arbitration term was substantively unconsciona-
ble.  Given the difference in emphasis, as reflected in the high score, it is not surprising
that Balandran did not cite Fittante.
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The examination of differences in Table 1 suggests strong differ-
ences between precedents that are cited and those that are not cited.
Of particular interest for the hypotheses is whether cited precedents
are more likely to have the same outcome in the case at hand.  Look-
ing at the first dataset, 62.34% of cited courts of appeal precedents
have the same outcome as the case at hand.  Of the pool of courts of
appeal precedents not cited, just 48.33% have the same outcome as
the case at hand.  This difference is significant at the 1% level, mean-
ing that there is a 99% chance that the difference between the two
numbers was not generated by coincidence but rather results from a
meaningful difference.
Thus, the interpretation of the data appears to run counter to the
claim that the outcomes of cited precedents reflect the entire pool of
precedents.  Pro-plaintiff decisions cite more pro-plaintiff precedents;
pro-defendant decisions cite more pro-defendant precedents.  The
data on supreme court precedents also exhibit this positive correla-
tion in outcomes.
An alternative way of presenting this result is to ask the following:
Are we more likely to see a precedent cited if it has the same outcome
as the case in hand?  The data suggest so, as 11.74% of all potential
citations of courts of appeals precedents result in citation when the
case and the precedent share the same outcome.  Only 6.99% of all
potential citations of courts of appeal precedents result in citation
when the outcomes differ.  This differential of nearly 5 percentage
points is significant, especially in light of the infrequency with which
courts of appeal precedents are cited overall.  Turning to supreme
court precedents, 58.14% of potential citations result in citation when
the case and precedent share the same result compared to just 44.44%
of potential citations when the result differs.  This differential is signif-
icant at the 5% level.  The results presented thus far suggest that opin-
ions are more likely to cite precedent with the same outcomes than
those with different outcomes.  To ensure that this interpretation is
accurate, however, a more sophisticated model controlling for addi-
tional factors is explored below.
B. Multivariate Analysis
I performed a series of statistical tests that controlled for a variety
of factors that may affect citations to ensure that the above correlation
persists.  The basic equation used to conduct this analysis explored
if—and to what relative extent—several variables affect the likelihood
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that a case explicitly refers to a given precedent.74  Included in the
formula is one dependent variable—that is, the one that I would like
to explain that measures whether a given case cites a given prece-
dent.75  In addition, four independent variables are examined—that
might affect the outcome of the dependent variable: (1) whether a
given case has the same outcome as a given precedent,76 (2) the
length of time that passes between two cases, (3) the contracting envi-
ronment, and (4) differences in the factors stressed by the courts in
each case.  The equation was run twice.  Model 1 looks at the 2,556
potential citations of courts of appeal precedents.  Model 2 looks at
the 273 potential citations of supreme court precedents.  I report the
marginal effects.77
The main takeaway from Table 2 is that even once I control for
the other relevant variables, the outcome in a particular case is more
likely to be the same as a precedent that is cited.78  The coefficient on
the variable measuring whether a case has the same outcome as a pre-
cedent is positive and significant in both Models 1 and 2.  That is,
judges are more likely to cite precedents that have the same outcome
as the case at hand regardless of factors such as time, type of contract,
or the issues emphasized.
For the courts of appeals, the results presented show somewhat
marginal effects.  There is a greater probability that the precedent will
be cited if a pair of cases has the same outcome.  This difference is
significant at the 5% level.
74. Specifically, a series of probit multivariate regressions of the following form was
conducted:
Pr(citedik) = a + b.sameoutcomeik + g.Wik + eik
Probit estimators are more efficient estimators than ordinary least squares (“OLS”) when
the dependent variable is binary (that is, only 0 or 1). See STOCK & WATSON, supra note 26, R
at 296–330.  OLS estimators can generate predicted probabilities that are less than 0 or
greater than 1. See id. at 302 (“The linearity that makes the linear probability model easy to
use is also its major flaw. . . .  [T]he estimated line representing the predicted probabilities
drops below zero for very low values . . . and exceeds one for high values!”).  I also ran the
same tests using logit estimators.  For an explanation of logit regressors, see id. at 307–09.
There are no substantial differences in the results using probit or logit.
75. This variable, citedik, takes the value 1 if the case at hand refers to the precedent
explicitly at least once and otherwise takes the value 0.
76. This variable, sameoutcomeik, is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the case at
hand (i) and the precedent (k) have the same outcomes, and takes the value 0 if the
outcomes are different.
77. Reporting the marginal effects of the probit regression allows for easier interpreta-
tion of the coefficients.
78. Table 2 does not report results once I control for whether cases involve the same
judge or the same district, nor does it report the results of including a dummy variable for
each of the six districts in the California Courts of Appeal.  Although I included these
variables in models not reported here, they did not significantly change the results.
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If a supreme court precedent has the same outcome as a particu-
lar case, it is also still more likely to be cited than if the outcome was
different.  In fact, the statistical significance is even stronger (p < .01).
Thus, even controlling for factors such as time and context, I reject
the hypothesis that judges cite a representative sample of
precedents.79
The results in Tables 1 and 2 also confirm the prior results re-
garding the control variables.  Judges are more likely to cite recent
precedent than older precedent, giving support to the hypothesis that
legal capital depreciates over time.80
Similarly, the measures of context yield unsurprising results.
First, courts of appeal cases cite precedents from the courts of appeal
more frequently when the contracting environment of the two cases is
similar.  In contrast, courts of appeal cases that involve employment
contracts are just as likely to cite supreme court precedents that in-
volve consumer contracts as they are to cite precedents that involve
employment contracts.  This relationship is not significant, suggesting
that this variable does not affect whether a supreme court case is cited
by a court of appeal.
Further, when cases discuss similar factors, the precedent is more
likely to be cited.  The coefficient on the variable measuring differ-
ences in the factors discussed by courts in particular cases is negative
and significant in each regression, which suggests that this variable
explains to some extent the similarities and differences between legal
opinions.  Ultimately, it seems that where differences are high, the
case is less likely to be cited.
79. See, e.g., supra Part III.A.4.
80. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. R
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(1) (2)
Pr(cited) Pr(cited)
COURTS OF APPEAL SUPREME COURT
VARIABLES PRECEDENTS PRECEDENTS
Same outcome 0.0318** 0.1465***
(0.0144) (0.0248)
Difference in years -0.0086*** -0.0175*
(0.0016) (0.0101)
Same type of contract 0.0618*** 0.0587
(0.0155) (0.0541)
Difference of factors discussed -0.0459* -0.4363**
(0.0254) (0.2083)
Observations 2556 273
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at precedent level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE 2: Factors correlated with citation in the case-precedent pairs.
V. CAUSATION ANALYSIS: HYPOTHESIS 2 IS NOT ACCEPTED BECAUSE
NO EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT THE OUTCOME OF A CASE
DRIVES CITATIONS
There is a strong positive correlation between outcomes of cases
and outcomes of cited precedents.  This is consistent with the hypoth-
esis that judges use citations to ex post justify their decisions.81  How-
ever, the correlation is also consistent with the proposition that
citations represent influential precedents that lead the judge to the
outcome.82  To address causality and concerns of omitted factors,
politics is used as an instrument for explaining the outcome of a case
at hand.83  When the ideology of an authoring judge conflicts with the
outcome in a given precedent, I hypothesize that it is less likely that
the judge will hand down the same outcome as the precedent.  To test
this hypothesis, I use a two-stage test: The first stage predicts when a
case will have the same outcome as a precedent in light of whether or
not there is a conflict between the ideology of the judge in the case
and the outcome of the precedent.84  The second stage uses the new
81. See supra Part II.B.
82. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. R
83. See supra Part III.B.3.
84. The formula for this step is:
sameoutcome^ik = a1 + b1.conflictingpoliticsik + g1.Wik + uik
With binary endogenous regressors, I cannot simply mimic the 2SLS IV estimation using
probit analysis as it can yield inconsistent estimators. For a more thorough discussion of
this issue, see JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND
PANEL DATA 477–78 (2002).  I follow the suggestion of Professors Joshua D. Angrist and
Alan B. Krueger and use a linear probability model for the first stage of the procedure.
Joshua D. Angrist & Alan B. Krueger, Instrumental Variables and the Search for Identification:
From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 80 (2001).
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predicted variable to estimate the probability of citation in a given
case-precedent pair.85
Conflicting ideology between a writing judge and precedent is a
valid instrument for creating the variable same outcome.  For my pur-
poses, the measure of judicial ideology is significantly correlated with
the outcome in these 72 cases.  When an authoring judge was ap-
pointed by a Republican, plaintiffs won just 43.48% (or 20 out of 46)
of cases.  Compare this to the 73.07% (or 19 of 26 cases) of cases won
by plaintiffs when authoring judges were appointed by a Democratic
governor.  While not entirely conclusive, this difference is still signifi-
cant at the 5% level.  In addition, conflicting ideology and same out-
come are significantly negatively correlated.  This is illustrated in the
two panels of Table 3.  Table 3 shows that when the politics of the
judge who wrote the opinion conflicts with the politics of the judge
who wrote the precedent, the outcome is far less likely to be the same
as in the precedent.  When the politics of the judge writing the case is
the same as the politics of the judge who wrote the precedent, the
likelihood of a different outcome is greatly reduced. The negative cor-
relation between the two variables is extremely strong.  It is significant
at the 0.01% level in both courts of appeal data (left) and supreme
court data (right).
Same outcomes Same outcomes
Conflicting Conflicting0 1 0 1politics politics
0 18.51% 31.53% 0 18.31% 30.77%
1 31.85% 18.11% 1 30.77% 20.15%
BREAKDOWN OF THE 2,556 PAIRS BREAKDOWN OF THE 273 PAIRS
WITH COURTS OF APPEAL WITH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS
PRECEDENTS
TABLE 3: Breakdown of case-precedent observations illustrating the strong negative correla-
tion between conflicting politics and same outcomes.  When the politics of the judge con-
flicts with precedent, we are more likely to see a different outcome to the precedent.
When the politics of the judge does not conflict with precedent, we are more likely to see
the same outcome as in the precedent.
The key factor in determining validity of the instrument, how-
ever, is conditional correlation.  That is, does the negative correlation
between the outcomes of cases and the politics of the judge survive
the introduction of other relevant right-hand side variables?  The
strength of this correlation—controlling for relevant covariates—is in-
85. This stage uses the formula:
Pr(citedik) = a2 + b2.sameoutcome^ik + g2.Wik + eik
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dicated in Table 4 where the first stage of the two-stage regression is
shown.  Table 4 suggests that if authoring judges have preferences
that conflict with the outcomes of precedent, they are significantly less
likely to hand down a decision similar to the precedent.86
(1) (2)
same outcome same outcome
COURTS OF APPEAL SUPREME COURT
VARIABLES PRECEDENTS PRECEDENTS
Conflicting politics -0.2831*** -0.2424***
(0.0145) (0.0307)
Difference in years -0.0071** -0.0014
(0.0033) (0.0099)
Same type of contract 0.0202 -0.0523*
(0.0191) (0.0266)
Difference in context 0.0044 -0.0583
(0.0486) (0.0984)
Constant 0.6895*** 0.7016***
(0.0405) (0.1700)
Observations 2556 273
R-squared 0.0830 0.0580
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at precedent level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE 4: First stage of IV test predicting similarity of outcome of cases and precedents with
politics.
Having said this, however, conflicting politics is by no means a
perfect indicator of outcome in the cases in the database.  Looking at
the courts of appeal precedent data, just 8.30% of the variation in the
same outcome factor can be explained by variation in politics and the
controls.87  Turning to the supreme court precedent data, just 5.80%
of the variation is explained.  The second requirement for validity of
the instrument is that conflicting politics are not correlated with the
error term in the original explanatory equation.  While such a correla-
tion could occur as a result of reverse causation, this is not an issue
here because citations do not drive political appointment.  Second,
such a correlation could occur due to omitted factors (for example,
86. Large t-statistics are found for the coefficient on conflicting politics dummy, and
large f-statistics for tests of joint significance are found in each regression.  For more on f-
statistics, see STOCK & WATSON, supra note 26, at 167–69.  For the regression on courts of R
appeal precedents (Model 1), the t-statistic on the conflicting politics coefficient is -19.52 (p =
0.000) and the f-statistic test of joint significance is 287.65 (Prob > f = 0.000).  For the
regression on supreme court precedents (Model 2), the t-statistic on the conflicting politics
coefficient is -7.90 (p = 0.000) and the f-statistic is 28.70 (Prob > f = 0.001).
87. These findings reflect the R2 scores for each regression.
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the quality of legal representation) that affect both citations and out-
comes.  Here, however, most such factors do not affect the political
appointer of the judge in question.  Of course, it is possible to imag-
ine channels (other than through the outcome of the case at hand) by
which the political ideology of the judge could affect citation prac-
tices; judges, for example, may be more likely to cite like-minded
judges who were also more likely to be appointed by the same political
party, irrespective of the outcome in the case at hand.88  If this is true,
then it weakens the validity of the instrument.  In this particular
sphere, however, no prima facie evidence affects citations through
channels other than the outcome of the case.  Controlling for relevant
covariates, there is no significant correlation between the instrument:
conflicting politics and citations.89
Using the predicted regressor, same outcome (predicted), there is no
significant causal relationship between citations and the element of
the outcome that is explained by politics.  These findings are shown in
Table 5.
(1) (2)
Pr(cited) Pr(cited)
COURTS OF APPEAL SUPREME COURT
VARIABLES PRECEDENTS PRECEDENTS
Same outcome (predicted) 0.0185 -0.9973**
(0.0382) (0.4088)
Difference in years -0.0083*** -0.0196**
(0.0015) (0.0086)
Same type of contract 0.0820*** -0.0321
(0.0227) (0.0540)
Difference of factors discussed -0.0466* -0.4570***
(0.0246) (0.1745)
Observations 2556 273
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at precedent level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE 5: Second stage of IV test using predicted same outcome to estimate the probability
of citation of precedent.
88. Cf. Workshop on Empirical Research in the Law, On Tournaments for Appointing
Great Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 157, 175 (2004) (wondering
whether “[k]nowing that citation counts will be taken as a measure of opinion quality,
appellate judges might try to game the system, strategically citing ideologically similar col-
leagues, or engaging in a judicial form of log-rolling (‘I’ll cite you if you cite me’), in order
to enhance the likelihood that they or like-minded colleagues will have a better chance of
being selected for the Supreme Court”).
89. Indeed, as Table 5 shows, there is actually an insignificant positive correlation be-
tween politics and citations.
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If the predetermined outcome in the case at hand did influence
citation, one would expect positive, significant coefficients on same
outcome (predicted).  The estimated equations do not yield such coeffi-
cients.  The coefficient in Model 1, looking at citations of courts of
appeal precedents, is positive but not significant, suggesting that there
is no meaningful relationship between the two.  The coefficient in
Model 2, citations of supreme court precedents, is actually negative
and significant at the 5% level.  The fact that the explanatory variable
is same outcome (predicted), as generated by the ordinary least squares
regression, means that the coefficients do not have the same meaning-
ful interpretation as the coefficients in Table 2.  In other words, be-
cause the independent variable was created for the model, one should
not draw the conclusion that there is no relationship between out-
come and citation for this particular model.
The findings concerning citations of supreme court precedents
suggest that the element of the outcome that is explained by politics
drives judges to cite precedents that gave the opposite outcome.  For
instance, when upholding arbitration provisions, Republican judges
are more likely to cite the supreme court precedents that did not up-
hold the arbitration provision.
Another way to think about these findings is to ask the following
questions.  Are Republican judges more likely than Democratic judges
to cite pro-defendant precedents when holding in favor of the defen-
dant?  The answer is no.90  Are Democratic judges more likely than
Republican judges to cite pro-plaintiff precedents when holding in
favor of the plaintiff?  Again, the answer is no.91  This suggests that if
there is extra-legal decision making in this sphere, it is not reflected in
the citations of precedent.  That is, judges do not appear to be cherry
picking their precedents to justify extra-legal decisions.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. “Meaningful” Citations of Precedent
There is an issue of data quality when tracking the presence of
citations, and I sought to address these issues in an additional step in
90. In fact, Republican judges cite pro-defendant precedents less frequently than Dem-
ocratic judges, but the difference is not statistically significant.  Republican judges cite
5.68% of potential pro-defendant precedents when upholding the contract, whereas Dem-
ocratic judges cite 10.63% of potential pro-defendant precedents in pro-defendant cases.
The difference, however, is not statistically significant in simple univariate tests (p = 0.19).
91. Democratic judges cite 17.85% of pro-plaintiff precedents when refusing to enforce
the contract, whereas Republican judges cite 14.90% of pro-plaintiff precedents in pro-
plaintiff cases.  Again, this difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.28).
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my analysis, the results of which are discussed in this Section.92  The
mere presence of a citation may not necessarily capture anything re-
sembling precedential value.93  To account for the quality of the cita-
tion, I evaluate whether citations of courts of appeal precedents are
meaningful and provide support for a specific proposition or whether
they are simply throw-away citations.  For example, a court may cite
precedents to support procedural points such as whether the court
can review new evidence or whether the court can review the uncon-
scionability findings de novo, which may not capture information of
interest to researchers focused on the evolution of law.94  Nearly 10%
(or 23 of the 239 citations) of courts of appeal precedents are of this
type.95
Citations may simply cite general propositions about the sub-
stance of the law but not specifically support the decision in the case
at hand.96  For example, providing a citation for the proposition that
unconscionability is a question of law for the court to decide might
not justify the outcome in any meaningful sense.97  Citations of this
type can be found in 79 of the 239 citations of courts of appeal
precedents.
92. For more on this distinction and on the meaningfulness of different types of cita-
tions, see Charles A. Johnson, Citations to Authority in Supreme Court Opinions, 7 LAW & POL’Y
509, 512 (1985), in which the author eliminates procedural citations from the database
used to assess the nature of citations to precedent by the United States Supreme Court,
and Walsh, supra note 29, at 342, in which the author distinguishes “strong” from “weak” R
citations and creates a dataset to evaluate the use of precedent that includes cites only
where cited opinions deal directly with the doctrine in question.
93. Cf. Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383, 1391
(2009) (arguing that the “citation test” is controversial because citations “vary in impor-
tance” and noting that “some [citations] are centrally relied upon to reach decisions,
whereas others are fodder for only a string cite”).
94. Cf. id. at 1392 (“[A] judge setting forth the first explication of standards on a proce-
dural issue such as summary judgment may be repeatedly cited simply because the issue so
commonly arises in litigation.”).
95. For example, in Cohen v. DirecTV, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813 (Ct. App. 2006), aff’d on
other grounds, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37 (Ct. App. 2009), the court cites Fittante v. Palm Springs
Motors, Inc., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 659, 664 (Ct. App. 2003), for the authority that “the validity
and unconscionability of an arbitration agreement are matters of law subject to de novo
review where, as here, no material facts are in dispute.” Cohen, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 816.
96. Cf. David C. Vladeck, Keeping Score: The Utility of Empirical Measurements in Judicial
Selection, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1415, 1432 (2005) (arguing that “cases are often cited not
because of the trenchancy or novelty of their judicial analysis but because of either their
memorable language or their ability to distill a complicated legal issue down to a mul-
tifactor test that judges and lawyers embrace for the sake of convenience”).
97. Specifically, for example, see Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422
(Ct. App. 2004), in which the court cites Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671,
675–76 (Ct. App. 2002), for the general proposition that “courts will refuse to enforce
unconscionable arbitration provisions.” Abramson, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 435.
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Even if an opinion does cite a specific proposition with regards to
the substance of the law of unconscionable provisions, there may be
factors that mitigate the value of the citation.  For instance, points of
substance may be relegated to the footnotes of a decision.98  There is
footnoted support for specific propositions in 10 observations.  Alter-
natively, the citation may be grouped with a number of other prece-
dents.99  These “see also” types of citations support substantive and
specific propositions in 31 observations.100
To deal with citation quality measurement, I simply created a new
variable (citequality) that takes the value 1 if a case provides a discus-
sion of the facts of the precedent, if the case discusses the precedent
at length, or if the precedent provides support for a specific proposi-
tion.  The variable takes the value 0 if the citation is not meaningful
such as when the citation is used to support a procedural point or a
general proposition.  Further, if the citation is merely a “see also” type
of citation or is relegated to a footnote, it is regarded as equal to
meaningless and coded as 0.  Of the 239 citations, 102 (or 42.68%)
are coded as “meaningful” citations.101
These data are used to supplement my findings regarding when
precedents are cited.  I ask, conditional on a court of appeal precedent being
cited, are we more likely to see in-depth discussions of precedents that
have the same outcome as the case in hand?  The answer is no.  I
98. An example of this can be found in Independent Ass’n of Mailbox Center Owners, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 659 (Ct. App. 2005), in which the court cites Stirlen v.
Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 143 (Ct. App. 1997), for the specific proposition that
“[a]n arbitration clause that is so one-sided as to deprive the weaker party of substantive
claims, or the right to punitive damages recovery, is against public policy and unconsciona-
ble.” Mailbox Ctr. Owners, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 672 n.7.  Some readers may be concerned that
this categorization of footnotes is incorrect.  Even if I classify such citations as “meaning-
ful,” the results do not change.
99. Cf. Cross & Lindquist, supra note 93, at 1391 (arguing that relying on citations as a R
measure of judicial quality is controversial because some citations “are fodder for only a
string cite”).
100. For example, in Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 267 (Ct. App. 2003), modi-
fied, No. A098704, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 16 (Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2004), the court quotes Little
v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 983 (Cal. 2003), and cites Fittante v. Palm Springs Motors,
Inc., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 659, 670 (Ct. App. 2003), and Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc.,
113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 381 (Ct. App. 2001), as authority for the specific proposition that
“‘[t]he procedural element of an unconscionable contract generally takes the form of a
contract of adhesion.’” Gutierrez, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
101. I tried alternative dependent variables such as using a “score” that increases with
each characteristic of a meaningful citation (for example, discussion of facts of a prece-
dent) and decreases with each characteristic of a nonmeaningful citation (for example, a
“see also” type of citation).  These results are not reported but are of the general flavor of
the reported results.  The direction and significance of the coefficients do not change.
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analyzed the quality of the 239 citations of courts of appeal prece-
dents.102  The results are presented in Model 1 of Table 6.
The subsample of actual citations suggests that the higher quality
citations of courts of appeal precedents are more likely to be found
when the case at hand delivers a different outcome—as evidenced by
the significant negative coefficient on same outcome.  This suggests that,
conditional on a precedent being cited, greater effort is exerted by the
court to distinguish a case from precedents with the opposing
outcome.
I also ran the regression with citequality as the dependent variable
using all 2,556 potential citations in Model 2.  This assumes the cita-
tions that are not meaningful have the same weight or value as a non-
citation.  Here, in contrast with Model 1, there is no statistically signifi-
cant relationship between the outcome and citation quality.
(1) (2)
Pr(citequality)
CONDITIONAL UPON Pr(citequality)
ACTUAL CITATION OF ALL POTENTIAL
COURTS OF APPEAL CITATIONS OF COURTS OF
VARIABLES PRECEDENT APPEAL PRECEDENT
Same outcome -0.1619** 0.0027
(0.0631) (0.0068)
Difference in year -0.0202** -0.0041***
(0.0092) (0.0008)
Same type of contract -0.0527 0.0185**
(0.0852) (0.0075)
Difference in factors discussed 0.1488 -0.0086
(0.1209) (0.0128)
Observations 239 2556
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at precedent level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE 6: (1) Conditional on a precedent being cited, judges are more likely to provide
meaningful citations of precedents with different outcomes to the case to those precedents
with the same outcome. (2) The outcomes of cases are not correlated with outcomes of
precedents that have “meaningful” citations.
B. Examining Citations of Precedent Within Unpublished Opinions
The dataset was extended once more to include unreported, un-
published opinions from the California Courts of Appeal.  Unpub-
lished opinions also cited published precedents.  Data was collected
102. As above, I used a probit regression analysis here because the estimator is more
efficient than the linear estimator. For a more specific explanation, see STOCK & WATSON,
supra note 26, at 195–236, 302–07, 309–13. R
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on an additional 102 unpublished decisions from the same time pe-
riod as the 72 reported California Courts of Appeal decisions and the
7 California Supreme Court decisions.  This new pairwise dataset of
unpublished opinions contains 5,949 potential citations of courts of
appeal precedents and 554 potential citations of supreme court
precedents.
If judges cite precedents with a view to shaping the law in the
future, I expect that the differential between cited and non-cited
precedents will be greater in cases where it matters most.103  Published
opinions are contributions to legal capital and are more likely to influ-
ence the future development of the law.104  Therefore, I expect that
unpublished opinions (1) will contain fewer citations than reported
cases and (2) will more accurately reflect the state of the law, as indi-
cated by weaker correlations between outcomes of cases and the
precedents on which they rely.105  This is exactly what the data
suggest.
There is evidence of fewer citations in unpublished decisions: Just
7.93% of potential citations of courts of appeal precedents and
41.34% of potential citations of supreme court precedents are actually
cited.  Using the same form of analysis from Part IV on this new sam-
ple, there is no positive correlation between outcomes of cases and
outcomes of cited precedents.  The results are summarized in Table 7.
Pro-plaintiff cases do not disproportionately cite pro-plaintiff prece-
dents.  The only control variable of significance is the amount of time
between decisions.  Notably, even with unpublished opinions, courts
lean toward citing recent precedents.
103. Cf. Choi & Gulati, supra note 20, at 99 (“[I]f judges do act with an ideological bias, R
we expect this bias to appear where ideology matters the most: published opinions that
affect the development of precedent.”).
104. See id. (“Unpublished opinions, in contrast, provide judges with little ability to af-
fect the development of the law.”); see also Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary:
The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 259 (1995)
(discussing the representativeness of using published opinions only).
105. See John T. Wold, Going Through the Motions: The Monotony of Appellate Court Decision-
making, 62 JUDICATURE 58, 63 (1978) (arguing that judges “take ‘shortcuts’ in writing opin-
ions they have informally slated for nonpublication,” by writing shorter opinions, citing
applicable cases without creativity, failing to check precedents “for accuracy of quotation
or citation,” and being less critical of proposed unpublished opinions).
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(1) (2)
Pr(cited) Pr(cited)
COURTS OF APPEAL SUPREME COURT
VARIABLES PRECEDENTS PRECEDENTS
Same outcome -0.0006 0.0570
(0.0009) (0.0401)
Difference in years -0.0001** -0.0241**
(0.0001) (0.0112)
Same type of contract 0.0005 0.0104
(0.0010) (0.1172)
Difference in factors discussed -0.0016 -0.1070
(0.0028) (0.2204)
Observations 5849 554
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at precedent level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE 7: Multivariate regression indicating no correlation between outcomes of cases and
outcomes of cited precedents when focusing on citations within unpublished opinions
only.
C. Behind the Results
What conclusions can be drawn from the data?  I should be clear
about the limitations of my analysis.  The following question has been
answered: Do judges ex post rationalize decisions made extra-legally?
Pro-plaintiff decisions are more likely to cite pro-plaintiff precedents.
Pro-defendant decisions are more likely to cite pro-defendant prece-
dents.106  While evidence of extra-legal decision making appears in
the data, the instrumental variable analysis suggests that judges are
not simply cherry picking precedents.  Or, at least, they are not cherry
picking to the extent that ex post rationalization is a matter of selecting
precedents with the same outcome.
I have not said anything about the complement to the question.
The analysis does not necessarily suggest that the precedent informs
decisions, nor does it necessarily suggest that cited precedents are the
most influential or highest quality precedents.  The data do not speak
to such questions.  As suggested above, there may be other extra-legal
components to the decision making process—not captured by polit-
ics—that citations would be required to ex post justify.
An alternative explanation for the results is that ex post justifica-
tion does not manifest itself in positive correlation of outcomes.
Framing the decision within the law may not require judges to cite
precedents that have the same outcome.  Judges may make greater
effort when ex post justifying extra-legal decisions and may therefore
106. See discussion supra Part IV.A–B.
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distinguish cases with greater frequency.  This can help explain the
result that, conditional on citing a precedent, the quality of that cita-
tion improves if the precedent produced a different outcome from
the case at hand.  It may further help explain the counterintuitive cor-
relation found between politically explained decisions and the cita-
tion behavior of supreme court precedent.
Overall in this sample of cases, pro-plaintiff precedents were
more likely to be cited than pro-defendant precedents.107  This cita-
tion practice is true for Republican-appointed judges as well as Demo-
cratic-appointed judges.108  Perhaps in this narrow area of law and in
this particular jurisdiction, ex post justification of decisions is not
found because judicial opinions may simply respond to the plaintiff’s
case.  That is, the legal opinion simply asks whether the plaintiff’s case
is in line with plaintiff-friendly precedents or whether it can be distin-
guished from plaintiff-friendly precedents.  The later cases in the sam-
ple are disproportionately written by Republican-appointed judges
because of the preponderance of Republican governors in California
since 1983.109  The conflicting politics dummy is therefore more likely to
be triggered in cases where precedents have held a defendant liable.
Finally, the results may be driven by the choice of law on which I
have focused.  For example, the citation behavior of judges may vary
depending on how often the issue is litigated.  Many cases involving
unconscionability reach the courts of appeal level in California, but
not all published precedents can be reviewed and cited.  In this nar-
row sphere of law, only a small proportion of potential citations—on
average around 10%—are actually cited in any given opinion.  In-
deed, 21 of the 72 published courts of appeal precedents are never
cited by other reported cases in the pool.110  While there are a num-
ber of cases in this narrow sphere, the fact that there are only 72 pub-
107. This is seen in the statistics: 69.04% of actual citations of courts of appeal prece-
dents and 86.05% of actual citations of supreme court precedents cited a precedent where
the plaintiff won.
108. Focusing only on the courts of appeal data, Republican-appointed judges cited
11.56% of potential pro-plaintiff precedents and just 5.49% of potential pro-defendant
precedents, while Democratic-appointed judges cited 17.88% of potential pro-plaintiff
precedents and just 6.73% of pro-defendant precedents.
109. California has had only one Democratic governor since 1983.
110. Six of these precedents, however, are cited by unreported decisions.  All 7 of the
supreme court precedents are cited at least once.  For more on the frequency of citations
and precedential value, the specific indication that over 400,000 United States cases have
been cited only once, and a hypothesis as to why some cases are preferred as authority, see
Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law 37–41 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law, Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 8, 2006), available at http://law.bepress.com/sandiego
lwps/le/art8.
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lished cases—and therefore only 72 raw observations in my dataset—
may cause some concern.  From a statistical perspective, this is a rela-
tively small n. This may, of course, affect some of my statistical results.
VII. CONCLUSION
Judges are afforded a great deal of discretion in determining
which precedents are relevant and should be followed.111  This Article
has presented a framework for examining citation discretion and has
tested hypotheses of ex post justification using a sample of cases that
investigate the enforcement of contracts in California.  Based on this
study, there is no evidence that judges are ex post rationalizing extra-
legal decisions.112
First, the hypothesis that the cited precedents accurately reflected
the pool of precedents on point is rejected.113  The results indicate
that the outcomes of cited precedents are positively correlated with
the outcome in the case at hand.  This finding is robust in light of
several controls included in the analysis and the limited investigation
of particular subsets of my data.  Second, the instrumental variable
approach suggests that judges do not merely use citations to ex post
rationalize decisions.114  While the instrument satisfies the criteria for
validity, questions remain about whether there are stronger explana-
tions for the extra-legal components of the decision than politics.
There is evidence of extra-legal decision making as political prefer-
ences are significantly correlated with the outcome, but this extra-le-
gal component does not appear to manifest itself in justifications of
the decision that cite precedents with the same outcome.  Beyond the
primary findings, interesting dimensions of citation practice were also
uncovered such as the strong influence of time and context.115
This study, focusing on just one law in just one jurisdiction, does
not capture the entire scope of the phenomenon of judges potentially
cherry picking precedents.  It may be seen more broadly in other
spheres of law.  The framework presented here can be easily applied
to other areas and perhaps results will differ.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 5–14. R
112. See supra Parts IV, V.
113. See supra Part IV.
114. See supra Part V.
115. See supra Part III.B.4.a–b.
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APPENDIX
Key terms searched for in determining the context of the decisions
Neutrality of arbitration
Complexity of the contract Weakness of nondrafter Negation of consent provision
Ambiguity advantage accept AAA
ambiguous advantaged accepted adequate discovery
ambiguously advantageous acknowledge all disputes
boiler plate advantageously acknowledged American Arbitration
boilerplate advantages acknowledges Association
bold aged adhere approved by SEC
bold-print asymmetric adhesion arbitral costs
buried asymmetry adhesive arbitration cost
bury businessman agreed arbitrator’s fee
capitalize businesswoman agrees bias
capitalized capability alternative bilateral
capitals capable arm’s length bilaterally
clear agreement disparate attention class action
clearly states disparity aware class wide
complicated educated bill insert class-action
conceal education bill stuffer class-wide
confuse elderly choice conflict of interest
confused emigrant coerce conflict-of-interest
confuses emigrate coercive consolidate
confusing emigrated cognizant consolidation
conspicuous equal bargaining consent cost of arbitration
conspicuously equitable consented cost provision
different font foreign consents cost to arbitrate
difficulty foreigner consult costs of arbitration
disguise ill health deceive costs provision
disguised ill-health deceived costs to arbitrate
disguises illiterate deceptive curtail (w/in3) rights
double space immigrant disclose disqualify
double spaced immigrate disclosed due process
double-space immigrated disclosure due-process
double-spaced inability discuss evenhanded
fine print incapability discussed expensive
fine-print incapable discusses external
handbook inequality duress imbalance of rights
hidden inequitable execute impartial
important inferior executed integrity
inconspicuous literate executes internal
inconspicuously mentally explained JAMS
jargon migrant explanation limitations of remedies
large font migrants force limits remedies
legalese migrate forced mutual
minuscule migrated give and take mutuality
miscellaneous old hurried NAF
ordinary poorly hurry NASD
page(s) professional impose National Arbitration Forum
plain language sick imposed neutral
pre printed sophisticated imposition New York Stock Exchange
preprinted sophistication induce non mutual
prolix Spanish induced non neutral
prominence strength initial non-mutual
prominent strong bargaining initialed non-neutral
same type superior bargaining involuntarily NYSE
separate page terminally involuntary one sided
shrink wrap uneducated knowing one-sided
shrink wrapped unemployed knowledge one-sidedness
shrink-wrap unequal knowledgeable out-of-state forum
shrink-wrapped unsophisticated mislead partial
single space weak misleading reciprocal
single spaced young misled reciprocity
single-space misrepresent relinquishment
single-spaced misrepresentation restrictions on remedies
small misrepresented retired California superior
standardized mistake court judge
straightforward language mistook retired judge
surprise misunderstand retired superior court judge
tiny misunderstanding safeguard
unambiguous misunderstood safeguards
unambiguously modified SEC approved
unclear modify SEC’s approval
underline negotiable SEC’s imprimatur
underlined negotiate small claims court
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Neutrality of arbitration
Complexity of the contract Weakness of nondrafter Negation of consent provision
unintelligible negotiation unbiased
upper case non-disclosure unilateral
upper-case nonnegotiable unilaterally
vague opt in
verbiage opt out
opted
opt-in
option
opt-out
pressure
pressured
read
reading
signatory
signature
signed
silence
silent
threaten
threatened
told
understand
understanding
understood
voluntarily
voluntary
volunteer
